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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this study is to provide exploratory evidence concerning the degree to which 
geographical cost of living differentials interact with homeownership tax incentives in affecting tax 
system equity. Incorporating both federal and state homeowner tax subsidies calculated using the 
1991 Ernst & Young Tax Model File; the authors provide evidence concerning both horizontal and 
vertical equity in the system. Descriptive statistics and regression results provide findings which 
indicate positive and direct relationships between the homeowner tax subsidy and 1) taxpayer 
disposable income (increased regressivity in the tax system) and 2) taxpayer state of residence 
median housing values (decreased horizontal inequities between similarly situated homeowners in 
different states). These findings indicate that elimination of the homeowner tax subsidy accompanied 
by a direct subsidy would increase equity within the system. Furthermore, the findings suggest that 
the President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform (2005) recommendation for a home credit, 
with a limit based on average cost of housing within a taxpayer’s area, will result in a more 
equitable distribution of the homeowner tax subsidy. 
 
 
GEOGRAPHICAL EQUITY EFFECTS OF THE HOMEOWNER TAX SUBSIDY 
 
t is well known that federal income tax preferences such as the deductibility of home mortgage interest 
and real property taxes, the exclusion for imputed rent, and special provisions for the exclusion of gains 
from the sale of a personal residence effectively lower the cost of owner-occupied housing. Indeed, prior 
research suggests that this favorable tax treatment has actually increased homeownership in the United States (Rosen, 
1979; Rosen and Rosen, 1980; Hendershott and Shilling, 1982). The desirability of this policy objective is often 
discussed in terms of the generation of positive externalities such as homeowners taking pride in and care of property 
by making improvements which in turn enhance associated neighborhoods. Homeownership may also increase an 
individual's feeling of social responsibility by providing a perceived stake in the nation (Rosen, 1988). 
 
Examinations of the suitability of tax incentives used to reach this objective involve not only the effect of 
these externalities, but also potential tax subsidy effects on the distribution of tax burdens. These effects are often 
analyzed in the context of the concepts of horizontal equity and vertical equity. For this purpose, horizontal equity is 
characterized by similarly situated taxpayers paying similar amounts of tax. Vertical equity, on the other hand, is 
characterized by taxpayers in different situations paying relatively different amounts of tax. 
 
For individuals believing that vertical equity is characterized by a progressive tax system, Follain and Ling 
(1991) present results suggesting that existing homeownership tax subsidies actually decrease vertical equity by 
increasing regressivity in the system and providing more tax savings to upper income individuals.  Further, cost of 
living differences between states potentially exaggerate horizontal inequities already in the system by providing 
increased benefits to individuals in high cost of living areas relative to those living in low cost areas. 
 
Using the Ernst & Young/ University of Michigan Individual Model File of federal income tax returns (EY 
Model File), this study addresses horizontal and vertical equity effects characterizing the distribution of homeowner 
tax subsidies provided in the form of home mortgage interest and real property tax deductions. Horizontal equity 
I 
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issues are examined in the context of potential differences in the tax savings produced by these incentives between 
states. Vertical equity effects are considered in an analysis of the distribution of these subsidies among disposable 
income groups. 
 
Consistent with Follain and Ling's (1991) findings, subsidies enjoyed by sample recipients in this study are 
generally larger for high income group recipients than low income group recipients. Also, the within group percentage 
of taxpayers receiving a subsidy increases as disposable income increases. While intuitively expected, these effects are 
even more pronounced when examined in comparisons which include both federal and combined (state and federal) 
subsidies across states. 
 
 The findings of this study support the conclusions of the President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform 
(2005) that the tax benefits for home mortgage interest should be shared more equally. To reach this objective, the 
Panel recommends that the deduction for mortgage interest be replaced with a Home Credit available to all 
homeowners, not just a select group of homeowners who itemize deductions. It is also recommended that the 
deduction for interest on mortgages on second homes and interest on home-equity loans be eliminated. Furthermore, 
the Panel suggests that a limit be placed on the amount of the Home Credit. These proposals are consistent with an 
effort to increase the vertical equity of the homeowner tax subsidy. Furthermore, it is recommended that the credit be 
adjusted for geographical variations in housing markets.  This latter adjustment would increase the horizontal equity 
of the homeowners’ subsidy.    
 
The following paragraphs first provide a discussion of the concepts of horizontal and vertical equities in the 
context of homeowner tax incentives provided under the current federal individual income tax system. Next, 
descriptions of the data, analytical model and procedures used to examine homeowner subsidy equity effects are 
provided.  Result analysis follows.  Finally, conclusions and policy implications are presented. 
 
HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL EQUITY 
 
Mill (1848) first suggested that individuals with equal incomes should pay equal taxes (horizontal equity), 
and those with higher incomes should pay relatively more in taxes (vertical equity). While these concepts have been 
generally accepted (Musgrave, 1990), differing conclusions concerning the degree of equity present in a particular 
provision or system can be dependent on the definition of equal considered. Taxpayers with equal incomes may not 
actually enjoy equal positions in terms of living standard potentials. This study details an analysis into the effect of a 
general disregard for the effect of cost of living differentials across geographical locations in determinations of an 
individual's equitable share of the federal income tax burden. 
 
Assume that taxpayers A and B are both single with identical occupations.  Taxpayer A lives in a major 
metropolitan area where the costs of housing, food and other essential elements of living are substantially higher than 
the costs of living in the rural area in which B lives. A and B receive before-tax salaries of $70,000 and $50,000, 
respectively.  However, this $20,000 salary difference exists only to equate cost of living differences between the two 
areas and allow both A and B to enjoy equal levels of current consumption. That is, A's $70,000 can be used to 
purchase a basket of consumption goods similar to that purchasable with B's $50,000 in the rural area. 
 
For purposes of horizontal equity considerations, A and B are arguably in equal positions and should incur 
similar tax costs and benefit from similar tax subsidies.   However, a progressive rate structure that does not 
incorporate cost of living differences produces higher marginal and average tax rates for A than B. As a result, 
horizontal equity within the system is potentially compromised. 
 
This possible violation may be especially severe when examining the distribution of homeowner tax 
incentives. Large portions of cost of living differences occur because housing costs differ significantly from region to 
region. A review of the American Cost of Living Survey (Gale Research, Inc., 2002), illustrates this point. Composite 
cost of living indices for Amarillo, Texas and New York City, New York are reported at 92.7 and 239.2, respectively. 
Comparable housing cost indices are reported at 92.2 and 485.2, respectively.  As indicated, the effect of housing cost 
differentials clearly dominates the divergence between composite cost of living indices. As a result, homeowner tax 
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incentive provisions generally produce relatively larger deductions for home mortgage interest and real property taxes 
for taxpayers living in the more expensive location (New York City). 
 
While real property tax differentials envelop ad valorem taxes which are correlated with high cost of living 
differences, prior literature provides no evidence of a strong relationship between differential home mortgage interest 
rates and costs of living. As a result, mortgage interest deduction differences generally result not from rate 
differentials between regions, but from regional variations in the interaction between housing values and the 
proportion of purchase price financed. 
 
In this context, subsidy inequities (horizontal) occur for several reasons. First, mortgage interest and real 
property tax deductions constitute itemized deductions in an individual’s federal taxable income calculation.  
Estimated as the benefit received solely due to these homeowner tax incentive provisions, the homeowner tax subsidy 
received is limited by a ceiling which equates to the excess of an individual's total itemized deductions over any 
allowable standard deduction. Taxpayers in high cost of living areas may be more likely to qualify as itemizers and 
receive benefit from the incentives. Second, taxpayers in high cost of living areas are more likely to report larger 
excess itemized deductions.  Together, these arguments suggest that cost of housing differences across states cause 
taxpayers in equal consumption potential positions to benefit from different subsidies and pay different amounts of 
tax. 
 
While no prior research has addressed subsidy horizontal equity effects resulting from cost of living 
differences, two primary studies have focused on federal income tax equity effects in relation to real estate. White and 
White (1965) examined horizontal inequities resulting from differences in the federal income tax treatment of 
homeowners and tenants. Specifically addressing tax liability variations within given income groups, the authors 
provided evidence that subsidy elimination would actually reduce this variation and tend to equalize tax liabilities 
within a given income group. Utilizing the same coefficient of variation measure, Pierce (1989) addressed both 
horizontal and vertical equity effects under several different policy alternatives. While the conclusions of both studies 
suggested that the tax provisions analyzed resulted in similarly situated taxpayers paying different amounts of tax, 
neither study addressed subsidy inequity effects related to geographical location. 
 
Given the discussion above, this study explores the potential that horizontal equity is reduced as cost of 
housing differences across different regions interact with homeownership tax incentives to cause taxpayers in equal 
positions to pay different amounts of tax.  Additionally, homeowner tax subsidies may also hinder vertical equity 
among taxpayers in that high income taxpayers are more likely to enjoy tax benefits from itemized deductions in 
excess of standard deduction allowances. Only to the extent of this excess is any benefit received from the actual 
deduction of mortgage interest and real property taxes. Adding to the problem, progressive tax rates provide high 
income taxpayers with greater tax savings for each $1 of deductible expenditure than that provided to low income 
taxpayers. As a result, current homeowner tax incentives may inequitably encourage owner-occupied housing in 
geographical areas with a high cost of living and for individuals with higher incomes. 
 
DATA, ANALYTICAL MODEL, AND PROCEDURES 
 
As the latest available cross-sectional individual tax return data, the 1991 EY Model File was used to 
estimate homeowner tax subsidies enjoyed by individual taxpayers filing 1991 federal individual income tax returns. 
Providing a random sample of tax return information for U.S. taxpayers throughout the United States, District of 
Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam and the Virgin Islands, the EY Model file consisted of an initial sample of 115,594 
observations. 
 
Adjustments deleting observations that reflected residence in the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam 
and the Virgin Islands reduced the sample by 6,677 to 108,917. Further, "high income" observation variable values in 
the EY sample have been modified by elimination or “blurring” to protect taxpayer confidentiality.1  Of key 
importance in this study, the elimination of state codes and other geographical indicators made state by state 
comparisons involving these high income observations impossible.  After deletion of these observations, the final 
study sample consisted of 69,354 observations viewed as representative of non-high income US individual taxpayers. 
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VARIABLE IDENTIFICATION AND CONSTRUCTION 
 
Variables drawn from existing data sources were chosen to represent the following relevant taxpayer 
characteristics: state of residence (STATE), filing status (FILSTAT), household size (HHSIZE), and taxpayer 
disposable income (INCOME). For this purpose, STATE values reflected median housing costs acquired on a state by 
state basis from 1990 census data (Appendix A). Controlling for taxpayer family characteristics and responsibilities, 
FILSTAT and HHSIZE were available from the EY Model File. HHSIZE was calculated by reducing the taxpayer's 
total number of reported personal and dependency exemptions by the number of dependents claimed by, but not living 
with the taxpayer as a result of divorce or separation. FILSTAT values reflected whether the taxpayer filed as single, 
head of household, married filing jointly or married filing separate. 
 
Representing a taxpayer's after-tax ability to consume, INCOME was constructed as AGI plus or minus 
adjustments for certain nontaxable receipts and nondeductible expenses recoverable from the individual's 1991 federal 
income tax return. Added to AGI were nontaxable receipts including certain portions of pension and IRA 
distributions, excluded social security benefits and tax-exempt interest. Subtracted from AGI were nondeductible 
expenses including federal tax liability before income tax credits, social security tax, medicare tax, recapture taxes, the 
alternative minimum tax, the tax on excess IRA distributions and nondeductible portions of self-employment taxes 
paid. 
 
Finally, the homeowner tax subsidy was operationalized in two different manners to reflect tax savings 
received both at the federal level (FEDSUB) and at a level combining both federal and state effects (COBSUB). First, 
a tentative FEDSUB was calculated to reflect the benefit received from federal income tax deductions for mortgage 
interest and real property taxes. This tentative federal subsidy was calculated as the product of a taxpayer's 1) total 
federal itemized deductions for mortgage interest, property taxes and points and 2) the applicable federal marginal tax 
rate. Since tax savings attributable solely to the subsidy benefit a taxpayer only to the extent of any excess over 
savings that would otherwise be received from the standard deduction, FEDSUB was limited to the lower of the 
tentative subsidy or the product of the taxpayer's 1) applicable federal marginal tax rate and 2) total itemized 
deductions in excess of the allowable standard deduction. 
 
For use in separate analysis, a combined subsidy (COBSUB) was also calculated in a similar manner. 
Accounting for tax savings received at both federal and state levels, COBSUB included the effects of state income tax 
homeowner incentives offered across thirty-two of the fifty United States.
2
  In calculating COBSUB, a review of the 
1991 individual income tax law for each state was made. Information from the federal returns was then used to 
estimate the state of residence homeowner tax subsidy for each taxpayer in the sample.
3
  The result was added to the 
taxpayer's calculated federal subsidy in reaching a value for COBSUB. 
 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
Table 1 details the average values by state for FEDSUB and COBSUB among sample taxpayers receiving a 
subsidy. Exhibiting strong distinctions, sample California subsidy recipients enjoyed an average combined subsidy 
(COBSUB) of $4,470.  Alternatively, sample South Dakota taxpayers benefited from average combined tax savings of 
only $841. Exemplifying the divergence throughout this sample, results revealed that taxpayers in the seven states 
ranking highest in average subsidies received an average COBSUB of more than $3,500. On the other hand, taxpayers 
in the seven states ranking lowest in average subsidies received an average COBSUB of less than $1,300. 
 
Further, a disparity in the percentage of total taxpayers receiving a combined subsidy across states is also 
evident. Over 52% of Maryland taxpayers within this sample received a combined subsidy. Contrast this figure with 
the comparable value for South Dakota taxpayers of only 16%. Together, these results provide evidence of potential 
horizontal inequities resulting from homeowner tax incentives.  Vertical equity impacts are reflected in differences in 
tax liabilities among income groups.
4
 Table 2 illustrates average values for COBSUB by disposable income group for 
1) only subsidy recipients (column 1 and 2) all taxpayers within the sample (column 2).  Consistent with Table 1, the 
percentage of taxpayers receiving a combined subsidy within each income group is also presented (column 3). 
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Table 1: Average Combined Subsidy By State 
 
STATE FEDSUB COBSUB COBSUB RECIPIENTS 
California $3,660 $4,470 47.17% 
New Jersey $3,008 $3,008 49.67% 
Hawaii $2,924 $4,048 39.08% 
Connecticut $2,897 $2,897 48.37% 
New York $2,860 $3,345 44.50% 
Maryland $2,833 $3,281 52.95% 
New Hampshire** $2,792 $2,792 40.95% 
Massachusetts $2,669 $2,669 46.36% 
Virginia $2,665 $3,160 47.68% 
Nevada** $2,427 $2,427 38.78% 
Illinois $2,346 $2,346 39.24% 
Alaska** $2,252 $2,252 27.20% 
Florida** $2,194 $2,194 35.29% 
Georgia $2,170 $2,762 43.40% 
Washington** $2,151 $2,151 38.73% 
Pennsylvania $2,116 $2,116 37.52% 
Vermont $2,050 $2,705 44.13% 
Minnesota $2,030 $3,236 45.82% 
Rhode Island $2,028 $2,586 45.21% 
Texas** $2,016 $2,016 31.10% 
Arizona $1,884 $2,217 45.52% 
Michigan $1,854 $1,854 43.30% 
Maine $1,803 $2,256 32.57% 
Colorado $1,786 $2,125 46.79% 
Delaware $1,727 $2,241 48.98% 
North Carolina $1,716 $2,179 40.33% 
Oregon $1,695 $2,196 47.67% 
Ohio $1,670 $1,670 35.90% 
Wisconsin $1,667 $1,952 39.79% 
Tennessee** $1,632 $1,632 28.06% 
Louisiana $1,613 $1,762 29.02% 
South Carolina $1,607 $1,964 38.97% 
Kansas $1,590 $1,845 35.52% 
Idaho $1,516 $1,848 36.72% 
Alabama $1,512 $1,772 32.49% 
New Mexico $1,499 $1,916 32.33% 
Nebraska $1,452 $1,699 29.29% 
Indiana $1,430 $1,430 33.54% 
Missouri $1,428 $1,650 33.81% 
Utah $1,418 $1,712 48.76% 
Mississippi $1,354 $1,606 27.13% 
Wyoming** $1,346 $1,346 20.42% 
Montana $1,295 $1,757 28.28% 
West Virginia** $1,282 $1,282 24.14% 
Oklahoma $1,228 $1,483 36.15% 
Kentucky $1,218 $1,516 33.72% 
Iowa $1,175 $1,527 30.02% 
Arkansas $1,027 $1,243 29.56% 
North Dakota $940 $1,298 25.70% 
South Dakota" $841 $841 12.81% 
** State with no income tax 
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Table 2: Average Combined Subsidy By Disposable Income Group 
 
Disposable Income Group 
Average Subsidy Over 
Recipients Only 
Average Subsidy Over 
Total Sample 
% Income Group 
Receiving Subsidy 
% Difference Between 
Income Groups 
$0 - $20,000 $411 $23 0.0547 N/A 
$20,001 - $40,000 $921 $351 0.3815 0.3268 
$40,001 - $60,000 $1,828 $1,249 0.6833 0.3018 
$60,001 - $80,000 $3,144 $2,508 0.7977 0.1144 
$80,001 - $120,000 $4,432 $3,731 0.8419 0.0442 
Greater than $120,000 $5,704 $4,834 0.8475 0.0056 
 
 
Examination of the results indicate potential vertical inequities. Note the $411 average subsidy per recipient 
and the 5.47 percent of taxpayers receiving the subsidy for individuals with disposable incomes between $0 and 
$20,000. Increasing with disposable income, these values raise to $921 and 38.15 percent, respectively, for sample 
taxpayers with disposable incomes between $20,000 and $40,000. Though exhibiting a diminishing rate of increase, 
this pattern continues for each income group throughout the sample.  Further, this pattern was not "averaged out" 
when all taxpayers in the sample were included. As illustrated, the average subsidy increases over tenfold from $23 to 
$351 between the first and second income groups. As before, the pattern of increases for all taxpayers continues at a 
diminishing rate with increases in disposable income. Together, these descriptive statistics marked potential inequities 
in the system to be tested using the following analytical model. 
 
MODEL 
 
In an examination of potential relationships between homeowner tax subsidies and the variables detailed 
above, ordinary least squares regression techniques were used in estimating the following model: 
 
SUBSIDY = 0 + 1  STATE + 2  INCOME + 3  FILSTAT + 4 HHSIZE, 
 
where, 
 
SUBSIDY =  homeowner tax subsidy (tax savings generated solely from the deduction of home mortgage interest 
and real property taxes);
5 
STATE =  state of residence median housing cost; 
INCOME =  taxpayer disposable income; 
FILSTAT =  filing status indicator control variable; and 
 
 
Based on a priori beliefs, SUBSIDY was expected to relate positively within the model to STATE, INCOME 
and HHSIZE. Consistent with Follain and Ling's (1991) conclusions, a positive relationship between SUBSIDY and 
INCOME would provide evidence compatible with vertical inequities. That is, utilization of subsidy benefits would 
provide higher income, marginal tax bracket individuals with relatively higher tax liability reductions. 
 
Alternatively, horizontal inequities would be indicated by a significantly positive relationship between 
SUBSIDY and STATE. A priori, taxpayers in high median housing cost states, such as Maryland and Hawaii, were 
expected to receive higher subsidies than residents in low cost states, such as South Dakota. Additional evidence 
would be provided by a higher percentage of taxpayers receiving subsidy benefits in high cost states relative to low 
cost states. 
 
Finally, a positive relationship between SUBSIDY and HHSIZE was expected for several reasons. First, a 
larger household in terms of the number of occupants was expected to be associated with the purchase of a larger 
home and accompanying larger interest and property tax costs. Second, increased liquidity constraints resulting from a 
higher number of dependents were expected to be related to increased proportions of financed housing costs. Table 3 
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summarizes these a priori beliefs in formal hypotheses. 
 
 
Table 3: Homeowner Tax Subsidy Hypotheses (stated in the null) 
 
Ho1:  Homeowner tax subsidy does not increase with increases in taxpayer disposable income. 
Ho2:  Homeowner tax subsidy does not increase with increases in taxpayer household size. 
Ho3:  Homeowner tax subsidy is not higher in states with higher costs of living. 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
Table 4 summarizes parameter estimates resulting from several applications of ordinary least squares 
techniques to the hypothesized model above. Applications are distinguished in that regressions I and II employed only 
the federal subsidy (FEDSUB) as a dependent variable. Regressions III and IV employed the combined federal and 
state subsidy (COBSUB). Within this framework, regressions I and III incorporated a sample of only subsidy 
recipients. The sample for regressions II and IV included all taxpayers (whether or not they benefited from 
homeowner tax subsidies). 
 
Table 4: Regression Model Estimates 
 
Variable 
 
Fedsub Models Cobsub Models 
Regression I Regression II Regression III Regression IV 
Subsidy  
Recipients 
Only 
Total 
Sample 
Subsidy 
Recipients 
Only 
Total 
Sample 
 Intercept 
 p-value 
130.97 -433.22 5.684769 -602.53 
(.0701) ***(.0001) (.9466) ***(.0001) 
 Filing Status (FILESTAT) 
 p-value 
-13.93 -77.559 -24.159067 -92.89 
(.6484) ***(.0001) (.5012) ***(.0001) 
 Household Size (HHSIZE) 
 p-value 
295.83 314.954 328.4412 369.24 
***(.0001) .***(.0001) ***(.0001) ***(.0001) 
 Disposable Income (INCOME) 
 p-value 
0.000214 0.000483 0.00025 0.000551 
***(.0001) ***(.0001) ***(.0001) ***(.0001) 
 State Variable (STATE) 
 p-value 
0.013444 0.007446 0.016922 0.009598 
***(.0001) ***(.0001) ***(.0001) ***(.0001) 
 Model Adjusted R-Squared 0.0814 0.0799 0.0872 0.0845 
***Significant for alpha value of .05 
 
 
As indicated, all regression results were consistent with a priori beliefs and reflected statistically significant 
positive relationships between homeowner tax subsidy and (INCOME, HHSIZE and STATE. Again, consistent with 
Follain and Ling's (1991) conclusions, regressive effects of the subsidy were indicated in the relationship between the 
homeowner subsidy and INCOME (Ho1 rejected). Horizontal inequity effects were further evidenced in this sample in 
the positive relationship between the homeowner subsidy and STATE (H03 rejected). While larger households 
statistically related to higher subsidies (H02 rejected), results for the relationship between homeowner subsidy and 
FILSTAT was mixed. Potentially reflecting the effect of community property versus common law states, the 
relationship between FILSTAT and homeowner subsidy was statistically significant in models applied to the total 
sample and insignificant in models applied to subsidy receivers only. 
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Further comparison between FEDSUB and COB SUB models (comparing Regressions I to III and II to IV) 
exhibited larger coefficients for HHSIZE, INCOME and STATE in the COBSUB models, suggesting that state 
income tax homeowner incentives act to further exaggerate inequitable outcomes produced by federal homeowner tax 
incentives. 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
In 1949, the United States Congress set as a national goal "a decent home and suitable living environment for 
every American family" (Weicher, 1979, p. 470). In describing increased efficiencies generated by positive 
externalities associated with higher homeownership rates, Rosen (1988, 144) stated: 
 
 Homeowners take good care of their property, keep it clean, etc., all of which make the other people in the 
neighborhoods better off, hence, the externality. In addition, homeownership provides an individual with a stake in the 
nation. This tends to increase social stability, another desirable spillover effect. 
 
In presenting evidence of a strong relationship between homeowner tax incentives and increased owner-
occupancy rates in the United States, prior research has attested to the success of these incentives as one method of 
reaching this objective. However, this examination suggests that this goal may have been reached at the expense of 
equity in the system. 
 
Based on the results of this study, itemized deductions for mortgage interest and real property taxes appear to 
diminish horizontal equity in the individual income tax system as taxpayers possessing similar pre-tax consumption 
abilities pay different amounts of tax.  Further, high income/marginal tax bracket taxpayers are provided with 
relatively larger subsidies than low income/marginal tax bracket taxpayers. Additionally, benefits appear to be 
distributed unequally across the fifty states with taxpayers in high cost of housing states receiving relatively higher 
benefits than similarly situated taxpayers in low cost of housing states. For individuals believing in the merits of a 
progressive system, homeowner tax subsidies appear to diminish vertical equity within the system as well. 
 
These inequities are especially prevalent for low income taxpayers in low income states. While it can be 
argued that other federal and state government programs address these effects, total dollars spent on these programs 
pale in comparison to the amount of tax expenditures provided by mortgage interest and real property tax 
deductibility.  Elimination of these tax expenditure provisions accompanied by direct subsidy distribution to 
homeowners might accomplish policy objectives while not hindering equity within the income tax system. 
 
ENDNOTES 
 
1.  The term high income returns refers to observations in the initial data file which reflected total income or loss 
of $5,000,000 or more; business plus farm receipts of $50,000,000 or more; foreign earned income and total 
income of $2,000,000 or more or total loss of $250,000 or more; and nontaxable returns with adjusted gross 
incomes (AGI) or expanded incomes of $200,000 or more. 
2.  For 1991, ten states imposed no income tax and eight states offered no form of state income tax subsidy for 
homeowners (Appendix B). 
3.  While the computation for itemized deductions was similar to that performed for the federal returns, several 
common distinctions exist. For example, one common difference involves the disallowance in most states of 
a deduction for state and local income taxes.  As a result, refunds of state and local income taxes are 
generally not subject to state income tax. Adjustments such as these, as well as other necessary adjustments 
unique to a limited number of states, were made on a state by state basis to estimate the state tax savings 
(state homeowner subsidy) resulting from the deduction of mortgage interest and property taxes. 
4.  While prior equity studies have determined income groups on the basis of marginal tax rates, no clear 
theoretical justification existed concerning group threshold determinations in the current study. While using 
marginal tax rate bracket thresholds would incorporate the relationship between taxpayer subsidy and tax 
rate, the subsidy is also dependent on such taxpayer factors as the cost of a home, the percentage of a home 
which is debt financed, and the total dollar amount of other itemized deductions incurred by a taxpayer. 
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5.  Dependent upon the particular subsidy being examined (federal or combined federal and state), SUBSIDY 
was reflected by the utilization of either FED SUB or COBSUB. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
1990 Median Housing Values By State 
Hawaii $245,300 
California $195,500 
Connecticut $177,800 
Massachusetts $162,800 
New Jersey $162,300 
Rhode Island $133,500 
New York $131,600 
New Hampshire $129,400 
Maryland $116,500 
Delaware $100,100 
Nevada $95,700 
Vermont $95,500 
Alaska $94,400 
Washington $93,400 
Virginia $92,000 
Maine $87,400 
Colorado $82,700 
Illinois $80,900 
Arizona $80,100 
Florida $77,100 
Minnesota $74,000 
Georgia $71,300 
New Mexico $70,100 
Pennsylvania $69,700 
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Utah $68,900 
Oregon $67,100 
North Carolina $65,800 
Ohio $63,500 
Wisconsin $62,500 
Wyoming $61,600 
South Carolina $62,100 
Michigan $60,600 
Missouri $59,800 
Texas $59,600 
Louisiana $58,500 
Tennessee $58,400 
Idaho $58,200 
Montana $56,600 
Indiana $53,900 
Alabama $53,700 
Kansas $52,200 
North Dakota $50,800 
Kentucky $50,500 
Nebraska $50,400 
Oklahoma $48,100 
West Virginia $47,900 
Arkansas $46,300 
Iowa $45,900 
Mississippi $45,600 
South Dakota $45,200 
 
APPENDIX B 
 
States Receiving Federal and/or State Homeowner's Subsidy 
Alabama Idaho Mississippi Oklahoma 
Arizona Iowa Missouri Oregon 
Arkansas Kansas Montana Rhode Island 
California Kentucky Nebraska South Carolina 
Colorado Louisiana New Mexico Utah 
Delaware Maine New York Vermont 
Georgia Maryland North Carolina Virginia 
Hawaii Minnesota North Dakota Wisconsin 
 
States With No Income Tax 
Alaska Tennessee 
Florida Texas 
Nevada Washington 
New Hampshire West Virginia 
South Dakota Wyoming 
 
States Offering No Homeowner Interest/Property Tax Deductions 
Connecticut Michigan* 
Illinois* New Jersey* 
Indiana Ohio 
Massachusetts Pennsylvania 
    * incapable of computing benefit from property 
